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The struggle over citizenship rights has switched between different routes in the past three years. 
Since Hosni Mubarak’s fall, Egypt has followed three major political trajectories, and the changing 
political configuration under each of them has influenced the evolution of citizenship rights. This 
evolution has not been a linear progression and the main political actors’ discourses on rights have 
shifted significantly.  
 
This report links Egypt’s shifting political phases to debates more specifically about  citizenship 
rights. It offers a general overview of Egypt’s recent political trajectory, before unpacking the 
various dimensions of debates over citizenship rights. In each of the three political phases since 
Mubarak’s ousting, citizenship rights have been curtailed. Crucially, the reasons for their 
constriction have been different in each phase. Some limitations have derived from largely political 
power plays, others from more philosophical-theological factors. It is important to distinguish 
between these different forms of debate if we are better to understand prospects for the future of 
citizenship rights in Egypt.    
 
The military led the first transitional phase and achieved a rapprochement with Islamists over the 
transitional roadmap while marginalising liberal forces. The lack of consensus between Islamists 
and liberals on key transitional issues, including the scope of rights, intensified the polarisation 
between the two camps, which has continued until today. Political participation, the right to 
establish political parties and media freedoms flourished in this phase but were still subject to 
certain limitations. The improvement of the rights of religious minorities, the rights of women and 
the status of human rights defenders was obstructed.  
 
Drawing on their organisational advantage and long grassroots activism, the Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB) and its Islamist allies were able to lead the second transitional phase. They controlled the 
constitution-drafting process and dominated the executive and legislature, but the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s rule ended dramatically after President Morsi was deposed by the military following 
massive popular unrest. Citizenship rights were severely restricted under Islamists and even those 
political rights that flourished after the revolution were jeopardised. The military, liberal forces and 
the official Islamic and Christian establishments sponsored a new transitional roadmap with the 
participation of the Salafist al-Nour Party, which, despite being absent from the protests against 
Morsi, distanced itself from the Muslim Brotherhood and joined the new transitional process. The 
Muslim Brotherhood and its allies have boycotted this process. They have also been the target of an 
aggressive crackdown and criminal trials.  
 
The military’s powers, autonomy and popularity have expanded in the post-Morsi era. There have 
been conflicting signals regarding the state of citizenship in this phase. While the draft of the new 
constitution has removed some of the limitations imposed under the Muslim Brotherhood, respect 
for rights has seriously deteriorated in the context of the security confrontation between Islamists 
and the military. Moreover, the contingent and heterogeneous nature of the political alliance that led 
to Morsi’s removal has created immense challenges for those political actors who struggle to 
expand citizenship rights.  Although, on balance, the new draft constitution  presented to president 
Adly Mansour on 3 December 2013
1
 can be viewed as a positive development in citizenship rights 
                                                        
1 The constitution will be put to public referendum in January 2014. The document is available in Arabic at 
<http://www1.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=1374102#.Up3FSxZxu8C>. 
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CITIZENSHIP AND THE CHANGING POLITICAL LANDSCAPE:  FROM 
JANUARY 2011 TO THE POST-MORSI DEBATE  
 
broadly defined, observers differ over the extent to which the new constitution will promote rights 
or social and economic justice in reality.
2
  
 
 
Since the uprising of 25 January, political activism in Egypt has witnessed an unprecedented 
revival. Citizens could freely establish political parties with fewer restrictions. However, the 
political scene was soon sharply polarised between, on one hand, liberals and leftists, together 
known as civil forces, and Islamists on the other. The primary point of disagreement revolved 
around each camp’s view of citizenship rights. Islamist parties scored dazzling successes in general 
elections and also managed to inflame political differences to varying degrees with civil forces, 
which did less well in the parliamentary elections and failed to win the seats necessary to influence 
legislation. Civil forces ascribed their electoral failure to their unfamiliarity with political 
contestation, compared to the Muslim Brotherhood, whose long experience with elections and its 
grassroots networks helped it and its allies to win a parliamentary majority. While Islamist parties 
consistently stressed their popularity and their ability to influence and speak for the masses, civil 
parties and religious minorities felt they were battling against attempts by Islamists to establish a 
theocratic state that would subvert aspirations for freedom, justice and equality.  
 
In March 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists turned the dispute over the constitutional 
amendments into a battle to protect Islam from the dangers of civil/secular forces. Civil forces 
proved unable to sway the majority of citizens, who approved the amendments, which the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Salafists considered a victory for the roadmap devised by the Islamists in concert 
with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).
3
 The Muslim Brotherhood adopted a 
domineering attitude towards civil political forces after the referendum on the constitutional 
amendments, seeing its vision as an expression of the popular will and that of its opponents as the 
demands of a smattering of weak political forces that were defeated in the battle over the 
amendments. The promises of consensus made by the Muslim Brotherhood in the early days of the 
revolution were soon forgotten, replaced by condescension and a desire for unilateral power. The 
Islamist forces’ biggest win was the stipulation in the roadmap that parliamentary elections precede 
the drafting of a new constitution. The roadmap also gave the party that won a parliamentary 
majority the right to form the constituent assembly, which civil forces read as presaging a major 
setback of the revolution amid growing fears of the rise of political Islam. These forces were better 
equipped than others to compete in, and win, elections and therefore influence the status of liberties 
and human rights.  
 
In an attempt to reach a compromise to end the conflict over the order of constitution-drafting and 
elections and bring stability to politics in the country, several public figures, political groups and 
civil society organisations drafted documents endorsing the idea of ‘supra-constitutional principles’; 
these were designed to provide guarantees for rights, liberties, democracy and the civil state prior to 
elections and would be binding on the constituent assembly when drafting the constitution. 
Islamists met this proposal with a fierce counter-campaign. Amongst their principal criticism of 
                                                        
2 Ali, R. “Inside Egypt’s Draft Constitution: questions over social justice.” 13 December 2013, Ahram Online. Available at   
<http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/88630.aspx>. 
3The SCAF formed a committee to draft the constitutional amendments which included lawyer Sobhi Saleh, a prominent Muslim 
Brother and leader in the Freedom and Justice Party, and judge Tareq al-Bishri, who is close to the Brotherhood. The committee 
included no representatives from any other political party, a fact seen by civil forces as the sign of a military-Islamist alliance.  
  
       
supra-constitutional principles was the explicit statement in all proposed documents that the 
constitution respect international human rights conventions and uphold full equality among citizens. 
In a public statement, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) stated that ‘these principles are 
subordinated to interpretations in international human rights declarations, which makes a 
constitutional text subordinate to international conventions, most of which conform to Western 
views and many of which have been the object of reservations lodged by successive Egyptian 
governments’.4 
 
Despite these objections, the documents did not advocate removing the constitutional text making 
the principles of Islamic law the primary source of legislation. Most of the documents retained this 
provision but at the same time they advocated constitutional guarantees for basic liberties and 
human rights.
5
 Islamists’ refusal to reach a consensus with non-Islamists on the constitution raised 
doubts and fears among civil forces that the new constitution, which might be written by an Islamist 
majority, would maximise partisan political interests and constitute a setback for rights and 
liberties.  
 
Notably, various political forces, including Islamists, accepted al-Azhar’s document on basic 
freedoms as general future guidelines. The language used in this document opened the door to 
restrictions on human rights based on vague Islamic qualifications. That is why a prominent leader 
in the Muslim Brotherhood stated that ‘the content of the document is exactly what the Islamists are 
saying.’6 Liberal forces also supported al-Azhar’s document. Counting on the fact that the current 
leadership of al-Azhar was in open disagreement with Islamists, particularly the Muslim 
Brotherhood, they believed they could use it to build a broad coalition to respond to expected 
threats from Islamist parties during the drafting of the new constitution. The al-Azhar document 
thus won support from key political parties such as the liberal al-Wafd,  the Free Egyptians,
7
 the 
leftist al-Tagammu‘8 and the Egyptian Social Democratic Party,9 as well as several political figures 
and movements aligned with the civil camp.
10
 In offering their support, these parties essentially 
invited a religious institution and the religion it represents into politics, implicitly deeming this 
institution an authority acceptable to all.  
 
The SCAF, which ran the country’s affairs following Mubarak’s removal, had no objection to the 
supra-constitutional principles and even attempted to exploit the idea in the so-called Silmi 
Document, named after the deputy prime minister, to push through articles giving the army and its 
leadership a privileged position in the constitution, thus reconfiguring military-civil relations. 
Islamist forces and some liberals rejected the Silmi Document, objecting to the preferential 
treatment given to the army and organising large demonstrations in Tahrir Square in protest.
11
 But 
in the 2012 constitution, Islamists forces, which dominated the constituent assembly, granted the 
                                                        
4 Statement by the Freedom and Justice Party, 6 September 2011.Availabe at: 
 http://www.hurryh.com/ar_print.aspx?print_ID=2308  
5 See Shukr. ‘A, “Hal al-Mabadi’ Fawq al-Dusturiyya hiya al-Hall?” in al-Rahman. ‘A. (ed.), Tahaddiyat al-Tahawul al-Diymuqrati 
fi Misr. Cairo: CIHRS, 2012. 
6 In a discussion of the al-Azhar document on Hurra TV, Abd al-Rahman al-Barr, a member of the MB Guidance Bureau, said that 
the MB supported the document and supported Azhar’s bans and confiscations of numerous literary and creative works. He opined  
that al-Azhar has the right to consider ‘a particular idea’s compatibility with Islamic law or lack thereof, as al-Azhar is the guardian 
of this law and authorized legally and constitutionally to guard Islamic law’. Al-Barr also voiced support for al-Azhar’s confiscation 
of intellectual works that adopt views at odds with prevailing religious views and interpretations. View the discussion at 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZXOG6c9WNkI>.  
7 “Al-Misriyin al-Ahrar Yu’ayyid Wathiqat al-Azhar,” al-Wafd online, 17 Aug. 2011.  
8 “Hizb al-Tagammu’ Yu’lin Ta’yiduh li-Wathiqat al-Azhar,” al-Shorouk, 21 June 2011.  
9 ESDP statement, 
 <http://www.egysdp.com/site/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=254:2011-06-25-10-40-57&catid=65:2011-05-02-
19-57-25&Itemid=202>.  
10 “Muwafaqa bil-Ijma’ ‘Ala Wathiqat al-Azhar,” al-Ahram, 18 Aug. 2011.  
11 “Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin Tusharik fi Milyuniyya 18 November,” al-Shorouk, 13 Nov. 2011,  
<http://shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=13112011&id=7f3facf1-ca11-4336-a1ad-231b88c894ea>.  
  
       
army certain privileges to gain its support, including giving the military autonomy over its budget 
and expanding the jurisdiction of military justice to prosecute civilians.
12
  
 
Just as they had turned to al-Azhar for support in the face of Islamist parties, some civil parties 
pushed for the adoption of the Silmi Document to counter the influence of Islamists.
13
 But these 
attempts flopped in the face of the growing revolutionary momentum at the time, particularly 
amongst young people, who were sharply opposed to the SCAF because of its alliance with the 
Brotherhood during the constitutional amendment crisis and the on-going human rights violations, 
for which they held the SCAF responsible.
14
 At the same time, Mohamed ElBaradei declared his 
rejection of the Silmi Document, which he believed gave the military an exceptional position in the 
political order that set it above the state.
15
 
 
After the parliamentary elections ended in January 2012, a power struggle ensued between the 
military and the Muslim Brotherhood. The vagueness of the March 2011 constitutional declaration 
enabled the SCAF to weaken the newly elected Islamist-dominated parliament and preserve its own 
ability to disrupt political processes it did not approve of. A controversial ruling by the Supreme 
Constitutional Court (SCC) on 14 June 2012 led to the dissolution of the parliament and allowed the 
SCAF to unilaterally amend the constitutional declaration to elevate itself above all public bodies. 
Moreover, an addendum of 18 June stripped the elected president of his powers over the military 
and endowed the SCAF with the power to veto the new constitution and appoint a new constituent 
assembly. In a sudden and unexpected response to SCAF’s increasing power grab, on 12 August, 
President Morsi removed top military leader Field Marshal Tantawi, commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces and minister of defence, alongside his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Sami Anan, 
and other senior military leaders. He also nullified the SCAF’s addendum to the constitutional 
declaration and replaced it with new amendments, which gave the president full power over the 
military. 
 
After achieving power, Egyptian Islamists were far more concerned with securing an important 
place in the emerging regime than with working with other political forces to consolidate the 
transition to democracy. Even more worryingly, many of their actions raised doubts about their 
genuine commitment to democracy and the rule of law. President Morsi succeeded in asserting his 
power over the military,
16
 but no reforms were proposed to avoid the politicisation of the army. The 
Muslim Brotherhood dominated state-owned media and used Mubarak’s press law to silence 
journalists. Moreover, the Egyptian judiciary was subjected to flagrant attempts to control its 
oversight of the executive and legislature. President Morsi confronted the Supreme Constitutional 
Court (SCC) and circumvented its judgment on the dissolution of the parliament, and he unilaterally 
issued a constitutional declaration on 22 November 2012 that gave his actions immunity from 
judicial review. The declaration allowed him to dismiss the general prosecutor and appoint a new 
one selected by him. When the SCC refused to submit to the president, Islamists besieged the 
headquarters of the court and prevented its judges from entering, in an attempt to obstruct potential 
judgments on the constitutionality of the upper house of parliament and the law regulating the 
                                                        
12 Saad, Ragab, “Egypt’s New Constitution: Entrenched Despotism,” <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/egyptsource/egypts-new-
constitution-entrenched-despotism>.  
13 “Al-Quwa al-Siyasiya wa Ta’dilat Wathiqat Silmi: Tarhib wa Rafd wa Tahaffuzat wa Hadhf Kalimat ‘Madaniya’ Tuthir al -
Tasa’ulat,” al-Ahram, 19 Nov. 2011, <http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/139045.aspx>.  
14 In early October 2011, Lt. Gen. Sami Anan, then military chief of staff, met with several political parties, both civil and Islamist. 
The meeting ended with party representatives signing a document supporting the SCAF, lauding its protection of the revolution and 
the rotation of power, and stressing the need to adopt supra-constitutional principles binding on the constituent assembly. The 
meeting sparked a storm of criticism that led most parties to retract their endorsement of the document.  
15 “Al-Baradi’i: Ishabu Wathiqat al-Silmi al-Mushawwaha, al-Jaysh lan Yakun Dawla Fawq al-Dawla,” al-Masry al-Youm, 2 Nov. 
2011, <http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/511212>.  
16 See El Fegiery, M., “Crunch Time for Egypt’s Civil-Military Relations,” FRIDE Policy Brief, 14 Aug. 2012,   
<http://www.fride.org/publication/1054/crunch-time-for-egypt’s-civil-military-relations>.  
  
       
constituent assembly. In the name of reforming the judiciary, President Morsi and the Muslim 
Brotherhood sought to stifle the powers of the SCC, and Islamists used the 2012 constitution as an 
opportunity to achieve this goal. Article 233 reduced the number of judges in the SCC from 17 to 
11, leading to the removal of its six newest members from the bench. Article 176 gave the authority 
to nominate the SCC’s judges to various judicial and non-judicial organs and provided for their 
appointment by presidential decree; prior to this, the SCC general assembly approved the 
appointment of its members and president. The new system therefore allowed the government to 
restructure the composition of the court. Moreover, a new law regulating the court was drafted with 
the potential to circumscribe its jurisdiction. This attack on the judiciary was not an attempt at 
judicial reform, as claimed by the president and his supporters, but rather actions to instrumentalise 
the judiciary in order to serve political goals. 
 
The 2012 constitution was passed in a climate of intense political and legal disputes. From the 
beginning of the constitution-making process in early 2012, non-Islamist forces protested the non-
representative constituent assembly. Although the judiciary dissolved the first assembly for certain 
defects in its membership, Islamists and their political allies also dominated the second constituent 
assembly. The representation of women and non-Muslims was very low. Through the constitutional 
declaration of 22 November 2012, President Morsi allowed the constituent assembly to hastily 
finalise the draft constitution far from judicial oversight. In a public referendum on 15 December 
2012, 63.8% of voters approved the constitution and 36.3% voted against it; the turnout was 32.9%. 
These figures indicate that the constitution was approved by a small segment of Egyptian society.  
 
The constitutional declaration issued by Morsi on 22 November 2012 was a turning point for the 
liberal and leftist opposition, which came together under the umbrella of the National Salvation 
Front (NSF), a coalition that aimed to pressure the Muslim Brotherhood to become more inclusive 
in its management of the transition. But when the NSF was unable to organise its efforts and 
energies and exploit the popular dissatisfaction with the policies of the president, his government 
and the Muslim Brotherhood, the Tamarod (Rebellion) youth movement emerged, launching a 
grassroots campaign to collect signatures for a petition withdrawing confidence from Morsi and 
forcing him to hold early presidential elections. Remarkably, after the adoption of the 2012 
constitution, the Islamist alliance began to crumble, as the Nour Party accused the Muslim 
Brotherhood of failing to execute agreements they had made
17
 and claimed that Muslim 
Brotherhood loyalists were monopolising positions of power while excluding those affiliated with 
al-Nour. Morsi also removed his al- Nour-affiliated advisor. All of this ultimately led to the collapse 
of al-Nour-MB alliance. While the Nour Party engaged in talks with the NSF,
18
 it did not support 
the NSF’s goal of bringing down Morsi19 and did not urge participation in the protests of 30 June 
2013, but it did back the new roadmap after Morsi was deposed. 
 
The NSF supported Tamarod and helped collect signatures through their provincial headquarters, 
also helping to mobilise for the 30 June demonstrations called by the youth movement. Massive 
numbers of citizens responded and turned out for packed demonstrations in the capital and 
elsewhere, prompting the army to intervene. The army officially deposed Morsi in the presence of 
opposition leaders, al-Nour Party, al-Azhar and the Coptic Orthodox Church, all of whom declared 
their support for a new transitional roadmap under which the president of the Supreme 
Constitutional Court was appointed interim president. The new roadmap opted for a consensual 
constitution by guaranteeing that the constitutional assembly appointed by the interim president 
                                                        
17 See al-Ahram, 31 May 2013, <http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/353763.aspx>.  
18 “Jabhat al-Inqadh Tu’lin Nata’ij al-Hiwar ma’ al-Nour,” al-Masry al-Youm, 30 Jan. 2013,  
<http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/1433736>.  
19 “Burhami: Nattafiq Ma’ Matalib al-Inqadh ‘Ada Isqat Morsi,” al-Masry al-Youm, 30 Jan. 2013,  
<http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/1433651>.  
  
       
would be representative and inclusive. The assembly involved different political parties regardless 
of their electoral weight and religious groups as well as youth, women and ethnic minorities. 
Islamists were represented, but the Muslim Brotherhood boycotted the assembly.  
 
This phase marked yet another turning point in the Egyptian revolution and the political scene. 
Following the unconditional support of the NSF and Tamarod for the army’s intervention in politics 
and the ouster of Morsi, much of the public began to accept a larger political role for the military, 
partly due to the weakness of political parties and partly fearing the spread of violence. The civil 
parties in the NSF disagreed about the minister of defence running for the presidency,
20
 a move 
supported by Tamarod leaders.
21
 At the same time, many politicians withdrew their support for 
certain rights,
22
 while those defending citizenship rights and decrying human rights abuses were 
branded traitors, and both the state-owned and private media provided unconditional support for the 
military confrontation against the Muslim Brotherhood.  
 
Different narratives are provided to explain what happened in Egypt on 3 July 2013. The Muslim 
Brotherhood and its allies maintain that it was a military coup against an elected president and a 
political process approved by the people in general elections and a referendum. In contrast, most 
non-Islamist forces were convinced that Morsi’s legitimacy was compromised by certain actions 
taken by him while in power, including the exclusionary constitution-drafting process, the 
circumvention of the judiciary to quickly pass the constitution and the serious infringement of 
human rights and freedom of expression. They also argued that political contestation was seriously 
restricted under the Muslim Brotherhood, whom, they alleged, used legal tactics such as the 
elections law and their domination of state institutions to ensure their overwhelming victory in any 
general elections.  
 
Non-Islamist forces took to the streets in June 2013 as a response to these setbacks. The 
involvement of ordinary people in these protests was remarkable and provided a solid basis for the 
demands of non-Islamists. Morsi and his group dismissed these demands. Some of the actors who 
protested against Morsi wanted to pressure him to organise an early presidential election, but others 
counted on the interference of the military to overthrow him, which is what ultimately happened. 
The escalation of protests without an adequate response from the president prompted the military to 
intervene and devise a new roadmap with other political forces. The portrayal of what happened as 
a traditional military coup against an elected leader fails to address the root causes that led to the 
interference of the military. 
 
Nevertheless, it remains true that those who aligned with one another to oust Morsi were driven by 
conflicting political agendas for the post-Muslim Brotherhood era. The military’s objective has 
been to secure certain types of control over future civilian governments. The Salafist al-Nour Party 
has attempted to ensure that the direction of the new transition is compatible with an Islamic 
framework and that Islamists are not excluded. Al-Azhar has endeavoured to counter the political 
influence of Islamists and to counter any assumption that the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood 
                                                        
20 “Inqisam Dakhil Jabhat al-Inqadh Hawl Tarashuh al-Sisi Lil-Ri’asa,” al-Masry al-Youm, 12 Oct. 2013,  
<http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/2201296>. 
21 See al-Masry al-Youm, 15 Oct. 2013, <http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/2209016>.  
22 Mohamed ElBaradei was fiercely attacked for resigning as vice-president in protest at the use of excessive force to disperse the sit-
ins by Morsi supporters in Rabaa al-Adawiya and Nahda Squares. Amr Hamzawi, the president of Masr al-Hurriya and a member of 
the NSF, also came under attack because of his news columns, his opposition to attempts to build a new authoritarian order after 3 
July 2013 hostile to rights and liberties and his calls for liberal and leftist parties in the NSF to reconsider their support for  army 
intervention and Morsi’s ouster. See, for example, Hamzawi, “Azmat al-Libraliya al-Misriya” al-Shorouk, 31 July 2013, 
<http://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?id=fde089fa-3c35-41d6-b3c0-8820f876ff6a>; Hamzawi, “Misr Ba’d 30 July 
2013’, al-Shorouk, 12 Oct. 2013, 
 <http://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?id=e9afc45e-b122-4906-8c9c-161d3173e6b6>; see also al-Shorouk, 19 Oct. 
2013, <http://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=19102013&id=28d62f61-ca0a-407f-97a6-291aeb4cea58>.  
  
       
   CITIZENSHIP, SHARI’A AND THE CONSTITUTION 
 
was conducted to downsize the public role of Islam. The remnants of the Mubarak regime who 
joined and supported the protests against Morsi harbour ambitions of a return to politics, drawing 
on their organisational and financial capacity. Liberal forces want to pursue the postponed 
revolutionary agenda, but although their organisational capacity and popularity has gradually 
increased since the fall of Mubarak, other political forces such as the military, Islamists, the 
remnants of Mubarak regime and al-Azhar overshadow them. This power structure has affected 
their political choices in the post-Brotherhood era, as we will see in the following sections.  
 
As for the future role of the Muslim Brotherhood, current indicators suggest that the group will 
continue its resistance to the new transitional plan. It is counting on a possible divide in the alliance 
that ousted Morsi, but liberal forces seem loath to align themselves with the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The transitional government has not locked the Muslim Brotherhood out of the political process, but 
it has imposed new rules. While the association of the Muslim Brotherhood was dissolved, the 
Freedom and Justice Party is still legal and can field candidates for the upcoming parliamentary and 
presidential elections. Nevertheless, the group still refuses to acknowledge the new roadmap and 
continues its street protests.  
 
 
 
Islamists have argued that their conception of Shari‘a (Islamic law) as state law is reconcilable with 
a constitutional, democratic state, noting that they seek to establish not a religious state but a ‘civil 
state with an Islamic reference’. Islamist parties share the view that Islam offers comprehensive 
guidance across the political, economic, social and cultural spheres, and so believe in the supremacy 
of Shari‘a.23 The Nour Party generally agrees with the FJP on the structure and nature of the 
‘Islamic version’ of democracy governed by Shari‘a, but it rejects the term ‘civil state’, fearing the 
idea could undermine the application of Islamic law.
24
 Like the FJP, al-Nour rejects both the 
theocratic and the secular state. It affirms its belief in an Islamic, modern, constitutional state where 
representative democracy is practiced in accordance with Shari‘a. This state, according to al-Nour, 
would be based on the separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary and respect for rights 
and public liberties.
25
  
  
Although most civil forces do not explicitly advocate a separation between state and religion or the 
omission of Shari‘a as the main source of legislation from the constitution, their understanding of 
the role of Shari‘a in the state is distinct from Islamists. Most civil forces are content to see the 
application of Shari‘a only at the minimum, as it was enacted under Mubarak. Others define the 
principles of Shari‘a as ethical values that are fully in line with social justice and international 
human rights. Nevertheless, few politicians explicitly call for a secular state given the far-reaching 
impact political Islam has had in society since the 1970s. Liberals and leftists are therefore 
politically constrained from openly challenging the constitutional provision on Shari‘a. However, 
over the last decade a growing number of human rights defenders and secular intellectuals argue 
that such provisions should be amended to ensure the state’s neutrality towards religions and 
respect for international human rights. 
 
The 2012 constitution represented an opportunity for the Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamist allies 
who dominated the constituent assembly to consolidate the authority of Islamic law to a degree not 
                                                        
23 See the platform of al-Nour Party (2011), <http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_headers>.  
24 “Hizb al-Nour: Narfuḍ al-Dawlah al-Madaniyyah,” <http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=567760>.  
25 Nour Party platform.  
  
       
THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP  
 
 
seen previously in Egypt. The constitution established a consultative role for religious scholars in 
the legislative process, with Article 4 mandating consultation with the al-Azhar Association of 
Senior Scholars on matters pertaining to Islamic law.
26
 This article provoked outrage from a wide 
range of liberals and human rights activists. In a public statement, 23 Egyptian human rights NGOs 
considered this move a bold step towards theocracy, where unaccountable religious scholars 
intervene in the work of the elected bodies, and they expressed worries that the article copied the 
Iranian system of wilayat al faqih in a different form.   
 
Furthermore, an explicit interpretation of Shari‘a was given in Article 219 as binding on all judicial 
and political organs in Egypt.
27
 The explanatory article was vague and overly broad, referring to the 
sources, methods and principles of Sunni jurisprudence and thus paving the way for Sunni juristic 
opinions ranging from hard-line to moderate. This explanation differs from the modernist approach 
taken by the SCC in the 1990s when it ruled that the legislator should not override fixed rulings of 
Shari’a derived from authentic and clear texts in the Qur’an and Sunna, but went on to emphasise 
ijtihad, or independent reasoning, in all other cases, in order to accommodate the changing public 
interest. Thus, whereas the constitution of 1971 left the elaboration of the principles of Shari‘a to 
judges, Article 219 ‘tie[d] Egypt’s constitution to traditional Islamic jurisprudence’.28  
 
Some liberals hoped that the new constitution drafted after the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood 
would include safeguards for the separation of the state and religion, but this was not possible 
within the new political landscape given the need to compromise with the Salafist al-Nour Party to 
ensure its support for the new transitional roadmap. Al-Azhar, whose political role was consolidated 
to counter the influence of Islamists, was also eager to safeguard the provisions on Islamic law in 
the constitution. Finally, the military did not seek to foster the impression that the ouster of Morsi 
was driven by a secular agenda. While this dismayed many liberals, through their intensive efforts 
in the constituent assembly they were able to water down the Islamist flavour of the 2012 
constitution. Under the 2013 draft constitution, the authority to interpret Islamic law reverts to the 
SCC in light of its previous jurisprudence in this area and Article 219 was abolished. The provision 
on blasphemy was also removed, and more safeguards are included to protect human rights, 
including the rights of women and religious minorities.  
 
 
 
The political influence of Salafists and al-Azhar in the post-Morsi transition and its implications for 
the place of Islam in the new constitution is not the only challenge to the expansion of citizenship 
rights after the Muslim Brotherhood. The military and its leaders have become much stronger than 
any time since Mubarak left power, making it difficult to fully neutralise the role of the military in 
the new political system. The army’s influence is manifested in the new draft constitution in a 
provision that permits military trials for civilians in crimes committed against the armed forces. As 
in the 2012 constitution, some of these crimes are vaguely defined and so may allow the 
prosecution of political dissidents or media personnel in military courts.The provision also shields 
military leaders from accountability before the ordinary judiciary for serious crimes against 
civilians or corruption. The draft further stipulates that the appointment or dismissal of the minister 
                                                        
26 Article 4 of the Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 25 Dec. 2012.  
27 Article 219 of the Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 25 Dec. 2012.  
28 See Lombardi, C. and Brown, N., “Islam in Egypt’s New Constitution,” Foreign Policy, 13 Dec. 2012, 
<http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/13/islam_in_egypts_new_constitution>. 
  
       
THE RIGHT TO PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND FREEDOM OF 
ASSOCIATION 
 
 
of defence must be approved by the SCAF for two presidential terms. Under this article, military-
civilian power relations are slanted in favour of the former. Like the 2012 constitution, the military 
budget will be reviewed by the National Defence Council, a body including military and civil 
actors, but under the new draft parliamentary leaders are involved in this process as well.  
 
After the 2011 revolution, most political parties, whether Islamist or civil, declared their support for 
the freedom of association and peaceful assembly in their political platforms. In practice, however, 
most of them did not consistently demonstrate this support, and contradictions between rhetoric and 
practice have emerged. The right to peaceful assembly in all forms—demonstrations, protests and 
sit-ins—was one of the most prominent gains of the 25 January Revolution. Early on, revolutionary 
forces repeatedly exercised this right as a tactic in the face of the new government led by the SCAF, 
as massive demonstrations in Tahrir Square became a common, effective tool to pressure the new 
regime. As a result of demonstrations by revolutionary forces, Mubarak was referred to trial and the 
SCAF was compelled to set a date for presidential elections and turn over power to an elected 
civilian president. While Islamist forces and parties voiced clear reservations about the expanded 
exercise of the right of free assembly, they did not hesitate to exercise it themselves to mobilise 
their base at certain political junctures.  
 
The MB’s distaste for citizens’ exercise of the right of free assembly only increased after its party, 
the FJP, won a parliamentary majority, when it launched a smear campaign against revolutionary 
and political forces taking part in, and supporting, strikes and demonstrations.
29
 Faced with a call to 
civil disobedience in February 2012, Islamists declared that civil disobedience and strikes would 
exacerbate the situation and lead to the fragmentation or collapse of the state. The assault on 
peaceful protestors staging a sit-in in front of the presidential palace in December 2012 most 
strikingly demonstrated the MB’s views of the right of freedom of assembly. Participants organised 
the sit-in to peacefully protest the constitutional declaration issued by President Morsi on 22 
November 2012. In response, the MB announced that its members would head to the palace ‘to 
protect the legitimacy of the president and confront protesters’.30 Attacks on the protestors by MB 
members and supporters ended with several dead and many more injured; many protestors testified 
that Brothers also unlawfully detained and tortured them.
31
 At the same time, Brotherhood members 
and supporters besiege  the SCC and prevented judges from entering and doing their jobs. President 
Morsi and the MB also remained silent when, angered by criticisms of the president’s policies on 
private satellite channels, Brotherhood partisans surrounded Media Production City, assaulted 
journalists and threatened to storm the studio complex . 
 
In the face of rising popular anger with President Morsi and the Brotherhood and the growing 
Tamarod petition campaign for early presidential elections, the MB and supporters of other Islamist 
and jihadi groups organised a massive demonstration dubbed ‘the million-man march to renounce 
violence’. During the demonstration, explicit threats and intimidation32 were made against citizens 
determined to take part in the demonstrations of 30 June 2013, called by Tamarod and backed by 
the civil opposition. 
                                                        
29 Mohsen, H., in Abd al-Fattah, A. and Atiya W. (eds.), Huquq al-insan wa-l-ahzab al-siyasiyya al-Misriyya ba’d al-thawra. Cairo: 
Friedrich Naumann, 2013, p. 35. 
30 See al-Ahram online, 5 Dec. 2012, <http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/279979.aspx>.  
31 CIHRS, “CIHRS Report Documents Testimonies of the Wounded and Demonstrators from Both Sides,” 26 Dec. 2012,  
<http://www.cihrs.org/?p=5361&lang=en>.  
32 See the video of al-Gamaa al-Islamiya leader Tareq al-Zumur taken from the stage at the demonstration,  
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PE9M56TDEt0>.  
  
       
 
After the military declared it had deposed President Morsi on 3 July 2013, MB members and Morsi 
supporters staged sit-ins near Rabaa al-Adawiya and Nahda Square. The sit-ins angered citizens and 
sparked attacks by the state-owned and private media, along with broad criticism from parties that 
had supported army intervention. Claims began to circulate of abuses by Rabaa protestors against 
citizens supporting the removal of Morsi.
33
 
 
Egypt witnessed more bloodshed as hundreds of Morsi’s supporters and members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood were killed during the dispersal of their sit-ins,
34
 while hundreds more were detained.
35
 
In this context, numerous political parties’ view of the right to peaceful assembly and even the right 
to life shifted markedly and fundamentally. Those who only a short time earlier had organised 
demonstrations, issued strongly worded statements protesting the dispersal of demonstrations and 
sit-ins and condemned successive governments under both SCAF and Morsi for failing to protect 
citizens and their citizenship rights now began to change their tune.  
 
After the dispersal of the Islamists’ sit-ins, the NSF expressed its approval, saying that the time had 
come for Egypt to declare ‘its victory over all political forces that seek to traffic in religion in Egypt 
and the region and victory over conspiracies by some foreign states that made a great effort to 
support the rule of the [MB] Guidance Bureau’.36 The NSF added that if Brotherhood supporters 
occupied other public squares, the Egyptian people would disperse them even before the security 
forces, a remark reminiscent of MB supporters’ threats to Morsi’s opponents prior to 30 June 2013. 
It is noteworthy that the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, for example, which routinely and 
strongly condemned the authorities for the use of force against demonstrators, did not respond 
similarly to the deaths of dozens of Islamists in front of the Republican Guard Club.The party only 
issued a statement in support of the sheikh of al-Azhar’s statement, which called for an 
investigation into the incident. The party did not criticise the new authority or hold it responsible, in 
contrast to their reactions to other incidents with fewer victims prior to 30 June 2013.  
 
In contrast, the Salafist Nour Party
37
 and a few liberal figures such as Mohamed ElBaradei broke 
with the mainstream when they rejected the use of force to break up the sit-ins, a move that 
prompted ElBaradei to resign as vice-president.  
 
In November 2013, the interim government passed a controversial assembly law that bans 
unapproved protests and gives the security apparatus broad discretionary powers to forcefully 
disperse protests. Press reports spoke of sharp disagreements in the interim government concerning 
the law. The law has been met with a torrent of rejection by human rights organisations
38
 and 
numerous liberal, leftist and Islamist parties.
39
 The FJP, which under Morsi had drafted a law 
restricting peaceful assembly, rejected the government-sponsored law as well.
40
 
                                                        
33 Amnesty International, “Egypt: Evidence Points to Torture Carried out by Morsi Supporters,” 2 Aug. 2013,  
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/egypt-evidence-points-torture-carried-out-morsi-supporters-2013-08-02>, and 
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34 CIHRS, “Rights Groups Condemn Lethal Violence against Those in Sit-in and Terrorist Acts of the Muslim Brotherhood,” joint 
statement from nine Egyptian rights groups, 15 Aug. 2013, <http://www.cihrs.org/?p=7060&lang=en>.  
35 Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Halt Arbitrary Action against Brotherhood, Media,” 8 July 2013,  
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/08/egypt-halt-arbitrary-action-against-brotherhood-media>.  
36 NSF statement, 14 Aug. 2013. 
37 Nour statement on the dispersal of the sit-ins, 14 Aug. 2013,  
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38 CIHRS, “New Peaceful Assembly Bill Undermines Egyptians’ Right to Meet, Strike, Stage Sit-ins, and Demonstrate, and 
Legitimizes Their Murder,” joint statement from 18 Egyptian rights groups, 23 Oct. 2013,  
<http://www.cihrs.org/?p=7416&lang=en>.  
39 See al-Watan, 22 Oct. 2013, <http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/343818>. 
40 See al-Youm al-Sabi, 18 Oct. 2013,  
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The right to association has also been a source of contention. In particular, the debate over the NGO 
law and the need for a new law was renewed in early 2012. Human rights groups discussed and 
negotiated the issue with successive governments under the SCAF, members of the MB in 
parliament and later with Morsi’s government. Islamists supported restrictions on NGOs, 
particularly human rights defenders, while liberal and leftist parties consistently supported the 
freedom and independence of NGOs. An exception was the liberal al-Wafd Party, which took a 
more hostile stance to human rights organisations.
41
 The party also helped to smear rights groups 
and called them a Trojan horse for Western forces seeking to bury the revolution.
42
 It also promoted 
dubious news stories about rights activists receiving secret funding from the US. For its part, the 
party’s newspaper has adopted an editorial policy of publishing appeals rejecting human rights 
organisations.
43
 Nevertheless, political interests led the Wafd to take a stance at odds with its 
convictions; as part of the NSF, it too rejected the NGO bill proposed by the FJP, which the NSF 
viewed as contrary to international standards
44
 and human rights groups themselves saw as a tool to 
quash civic action.
45
 
 
After the ouster of Morsi, a new NGO law was again debated. This time human rights defenders 
were involved in drafting the law under the auspices of liberal figures in the new government 
formed after the fall of Morsi. The draft law contains several improvements, but it still restricts the 
ability of NGOs to receive foreign funding. Nevertheless, the new political landscape is hostile to 
human rights defenders. The state-owned media has gone on the offensive against them, smearing 
them and accusing them of receiving foreign funding with the goal of executing a Western agenda 
inimical to the national interest. This is the same line pursued by the state-owned media under 
Mubarak.  
 
 
 
Certain aspects of Islamist thought inevitably exist in tension with freedom of expression. 
Critiquing religious doctrines or disseminating ideas at odds with the dominant orthodoxy cannot be 
tolerated by the Islamic state, and the Islamist belief that the state should protect Islamic morals in 
the society is inimical to the right to artistic freedom. The 2012 constitution provided the basis for 
state censorship of ideas and the criminalisation of blasphemy. In this context, the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s plan to control the public cultural sector and its institutions cannot be read in 
isolation from its approach to freedom of expression, as control of this sector would ensure that 
cultural production meets its Islamic definition of artistic creativity. However, the resistance 
expressed by intellectuals, artists and civil society to the plan provided clear evidence that what is 
considered ‘authentic Islam’ by the state or Islamists is not necessarily approved by fellow 
Muslims. In the post-Mubarak era, Islamists have been a driving force behind anti-blasphemy laws, 
which were used repeatedly under President Morsi to repress ideas critical of religions, as well as to 
target political opponents. To be sure, Islamists are not the only actors who support the 
criminalisation of blasphemy. But reacting to the increasing number of blasphemy cases under 
President Morsi, some liberal figures expressed their dismay at the blasphemy law. Key human 
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41 See al-Shorouk, 17 May 2011. 
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rights NGOs have also been outspoken about the negative implications of blasphemy laws for 
freedom of expression.  
  
President Morsi and his government took tough stances against the media during his months in 
power. An increasing number of lawsuits were filed against journalists on charges of defaming the 
president and the Muslim Brotherhood while, at the same time, President Morsi and his government 
tolerated the discriminatory discourse of the Salafist media and some Islamists. Instead of working 
to reconstruct the ownership of the state-owned media as promised in its platform, the Muslim 
Brotherhood used its political power to control the appointment of editors of public newspapers.
46
  
 
From the beginning of the revolution, civil parties advocated a free media and a free press. These 
parties often criticised Morsi and MB policies on freedom of the press, but the NSF voiced no 
objections when religious satellite channels were shut down on the eve of Morsi’s ouster.47 The 
media content of some these channels may indeed have been tantamount to incitement to 
discrimination and violence but the state did not follow an impartial judicial process to challenge 
them, choosing to shut them down through administrative decree instead. However, amid rumours 
that the military had a hand in suspending the popular TV show presented by the satirist Bassem 
Youssef in November 2013, several liberal parties voiced fears of renewed suppression of freedom 
of expression.
48
 Strikingly, Islamists who, under Morsi, supported the prosecution of Bassem 
Youssef on charges of blasphemy and insulting the president issued a statement noting that the ban 
was a setback for the 25 January Revolution.
49
 The debates on the constitutional provisions for 
freedom of expression in the new constituent assembly indicated that many of the restrictions 
imposed in the 2012 constitution would be lifted in the new draft, including the controversial article 
on the criminalisation of blasphemy.
50 
 
 
 
The rights of religious minorities were severely restricted under the 2012 constitution. According to 
this constitution, religious freedom was only guaranteed to monotheistic religions. This meant that 
other religious minorities, such as Baha’is, would continue to be deprived of their religious rights. 
The MB parliamentary bloc was outspoken against the recognition of the Baha’i religious minority 
in the parliament of 2005, considering Baha’ism a heretical belief that should not be protected in a 
Muslim society. Although liberal forces endeavoured to provide protection for all religious 
communities in the 2013 draft constitution, Salafists and al-Azhar obstructed their efforts.  
 
The constitutional clause on Islamic law in the 2012 constitution and the 2013 draft constitution 
recognises the rights of non-Muslims to apply their own religious regulations to govern their family 
and religious affairs. Many observers have seen this article as a step forward for the rights of non-
Muslims, since it represents the first time that a constitution has recognised the existence of other 
religions in Egypt. However, this article entrenches the sectarian regulation of personal status 
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matters in Egypt, rather than having one civil law for all citizens regardless of religion. Many 
Christians suffer from the strict regulations on divorce applied by the Orthodox and Catholic 
Churches, and some have converted to Islam in order to circumvent Christian prohibitions on 
divorce.
51
 The application of sectarian family laws means that members of each religious 
community will be subject to discriminatory religious regulations that are not in line with human 
rights.  
 
The rights of the Christian minority in Egypt have not improved after the revolution. The intolerant 
religious climate aggravated by Islamists’ political dominance has deepened the fears of Christians. 
Egypt witnessed a series of sectarian clashes over the past year, but the root causes of the injustice 
felt by religious minorities have yet to be tackled. By dealing with the sectarian clashes as a security 
issue rather than addressing the legitimate rights of Christians to equality and non-discrimination, 
the Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi repeated the mistakes of previous regimes.
52
 One 
fundamental demand of Christians in Egypt has been the removal of legal restrictions on the 
construction and maintenance of churches. While the SCAF and then the Muslim Brotherhood 
failed to pass such a law, the 2013 constituent assembly succeeded in including a provision in the 
draft constitution which obliges the first elected parliament to pass the law.  
 
Under Morsi, the state tolerated the incitement to violence and discrimination heard on religious 
channels owned by political allies of the Muslim Brotherhood. The campaign against the Shi‘a is an 
illustrative example. The civil war in Syria has escalated sectarian tensions between Sunni and 
Shi‘a Muslims, and Egyptian Islamists view the conflict through a purely sectarian lens, portraying 
it as a holy war between Sunnis and the heretic Shi‘a. In this political climate, the crackdown on 
Shi‘a increased in Egypt under the Muslim Brotherhood, and Morsi took no action to ensure 
protection for Egyptian Shi‘a. In a public conference attended by Morsi to support the Syrian 
opposition, Salafist leaders made inflammatory statements against Shi‘a, calling them ‘unclean’, 
and they urged the former president to fight any dissemination of Shi‘a doctrine in Egypt. Morsi did 
not reject these statements. A few days after the conference, a group of extremist Islamists killed 
four Shi‘a men in south Cairo for their religious convictions, amongst them Sheikh Hassan Shehata, 
a well-known Egyptian Shi‘a preacher. The killers identified their victims as infidels and enemies 
of Sunni Islam.
53
  
 
The inflammatory discourse against Christians reached it peak in June 2013 when the popular 
opposition to Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood dramatically increased after the military 
intervened to depose Morsi. In the sit-ins organised by the Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamist 
allies from June to August 2013 to counter other massive protests led by liberal and leftist 
opposition and to protest Morsi’s removal, Christians came under fierce attack. During this period, 
dozens of churches were burnt and destroyed across Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood condemned 
these attacks, but it kept silent on its complicity in the incitement campaign against Christians. 
 
 
The expansion of the rights of women has been blocked in Egypt for decades. Under Mubarak, 
limited reforms were adopted to improve the status of women in the family and the public domain. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
In the past three years, women’s participation in elections and constitution-making was very 
modest, and the parliamentary quota for women instituted in 2010 was abolished. In general, 
Islamist parties do not believe in the concept of gender equality as stipulated in international human 
rights treaties, arguing that international women’s rights corrupt Islamic social values and morals. 
Instead, Islamists advocate the concept of complementary roles for men and women. In reality, this 
means that not all the rights enjoyed by men are provided to women. This understanding of gender 
roles is reflected in the discriminatory positions held by many Islamists on marriage, divorce and 
women’s political rights. New liberal and leftist parties such as the Egyptian Social Democratic 
Party, the Free Egyptians Party, the Socialist Popular Party and the Constitution Party incorporate 
an explicit commitment to the promotion of gender equality and women’s rights in their platforms. 
In contrast, the liberal Wafd party has adopted a restrictive understanding of women’s rights.  
 
The protection of gender equality and the rights of women was overlooked in the 2012 constitution, 
which endorsed a patriarchal view of gender relations. Women were mentioned in the constitution 
as mothers and sisters but not as citizens with full equality to men. Article 33 stated that ‘all citizens 
are equal before the law. They have equal public rights and duties without discrimination’. 
However, the prohibition of discrimination based on sex, religion, ethnicity and any other 
characteristic was omitted in the last version of the constitution, leaving the text without an explicit 
provision on gender equality. Article 10 opened the door to discriminatory policies against women 
in the family and the workplace, using vague language to entrust the state and society with 
maintaining the authentic character of the Egyptian family and ensuring its moral and religious 
values. Under the same article, the state would guarantee that a woman could reconcile her duties 
towards her family with her participation in public life. The 2013 draft constitution improved the 
status of women by explicitly stating that ‘the state guarantees equality between men and women in 
political, social and economic spheres’. The draft also provides for affirmative action to encourage 
women’s political participation. However, the reference to Islamic law in the constitution will 
obstruct the realisation of full gender equality in certain areas of life, particularly the family.  
 
 
The changing power structure since the fall of Mubarak has influenced the evolution of citizenship 
rights in Egypt. This evolution has not been linear and the rights discourses of political actors were 
not consistent at all times. The exercise of some rights has expanded at certain times during the 
transition, but they have also been  subjected to attacks and restrictions at other times. In particular, 
those rights that require a new interpretation of religious and cultural traditions to support their 
expansion, such as religious freedom and gender equality, have often been obstructed.  
 
The 2012 constitution severely restricted citizenship. Some of its most egregious provisions have 
been addressed in the new constitution, but the political alliance that ousted Morsi includes political 
actors with conflicting ideological and political aims. The content of the 2013 draft constitution thus 
reflected the hard compromises made by all actors, but mostly liberal forces. In the new transitional 
process, those actors who believe in an expanded version of citizenship rights have been 
overshadowed by other political actors such as the military, the remnants of Mubarak’s regime, 
Salafists and the religious establishment, none of whom make rights a priority. But one should be 
aware that even liberal forces are not in full agreement on the definition of certain rights. Some of 
them have also failed to consistently uphold their principles when their political opponents have 
been repressed. In this atmosphere, it has become much more difficult to imagine a comprehensive 
process of accountability and justice for abuses committed since the fall of Mubarak. Some of the 
alleged perpetrators of these abuses are key partners in the new political process. The security 
  
       
apparatus has regained its powers within the on-going struggle between the state and militant 
Islamists. Leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood are now being tried for some of these abuses, but 
within a politicised and selective prosecution process.  
 
But what complicates the path to the future is that the political actors poised to achieve significant 
gains in the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections are not sympathetic with the agenda 
of the democratic transition and the consolidation of human rights. Even though the new draft 
constitution includes progressive rights language, its enforcement requires a government and a 
parliament that believe in these aspirations and are willing to struggle for improvement. This will be 
difficult if Salafists and the remnants of the Mubarak regime dominate the upcoming elections. 
Both enjoy significant organisational and financial resources. They will also benefit from the 
organisational crisis affecting the Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, the unprecedented popularity of 
military leaders since the fall of Morsi increases the chances of military presidential candidates. The 
options before liberals are very limited. While they are likely to be adequately represented in the 
upcoming parliament, they risk being marginalised by other conservative political forces in the 
future. Recently, dissent has emerged among liberals due to the performance of the military and 
security apparatus, but liberals and secularists have failed to maintain the political unity that 
previously allowed them to challenge the Muslim Brotherhood. Nevertheless, they can still seize the 
opportunity to coordinate their efforts in the upcoming elections. The project of democratic 
transition and socio-economic change remains unfinished, but they must undertake drastic 
organisational and programmatic transformations if they are to be influential. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
